The Battle of Grunwald: The Crusade That Broke the Teutonic Knights
Reading Time: 14 minutes On July 15, 1410, the meadows near the villages of Grunwald and Tannenberg in Prussia witnessed a major battle in medieval Europe, with immense consequences for the history of the continent. The Battle of Grunwald was fought between the Teutonic Knights and their enemies, the allied Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
The Battle of Grunwald or the First Battle of Tannenberg was the final act of a religious and territorial conflict that had been developing for over a century and changed the course of history for the Teutonic Order.
Prelude to the Battle of Grunwald: Tensions and Alliances
The Teutonic Knights, a crusading military order, began the Prussian Crusade against the pagan Prussian clans in the early 13th century. Empowered by the pope and the Holy Roman Emperor, they overran the Prussians. By the 1280s, the Teutonic Knights had full control of the region. After pacifying the Prussians, the Teutonic Knights shifted their crusading focus to the pagan Grand Duchy of Lithuania, starting a century of raids on Samogitia, which they sought to conquer to link their holdings in Prussia and Livonia.
In 1385, the situation changed completely after the Union of Kreva, in which the Grand Duke of Lithuania, Jogaila, married the Queen of Poland, Jadwiga. Jogaila’s baptism and his coronation as King Władysław II Jagiełło of Poland led to a personal union between Poland and Lithuania. This strengthened the power of both countries and removed the Teutonic Order’s papal sanction of its wars against Lithuania by posing as a defender of Christianity.
Contests over Samogitia and other regions did not abate. The Teutonic Knights, and in particular their Grand Master, Conrad Zöllner von Rothenstein, questioned the validity of Jogaila’s baptism despite Lithuania’s official conversion to Christianity and took the matter to the papal court. Territorial disputes and control over trade routes that pass through major rivers continued to fuel hostilities, making a critical conflict inevitable.
Prelude to Battle: The Road to Grunwald
In May 1409, a fire that started in Samogitia would turn into a major conflagration at the Battle of Grunwald. A revolt against the Teutonic Order in the Lithuanian-occupied region was soon joined by Lithuanian-supported insurgents. The Order’s Knights then threatened to invade in response. In turn, Poland declared its support for Lithuania and the threat of war loomed. Both states committed to supporting the other, and war was formally declared by the Teutonic Order’s Grand Master, Ulrich von Jungingen, against the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania on August 6, 1409.
The Teutonic Knights did their best to start the war with a pre-emptive strike, surprising Poland and Lithuania by first invading Greater Poland and Kuyavia. The Knights took and sacked several towns and cities, such as Bydgoszcz, while the Poles struggled to mount a proper counter-attack. The early success of the Order in the campaign, however, was short-lived as Polish troops quickly retook Bydgoszcz. At the same time, the Samogitians, who had entered the war, began raiding Memel (Klaipėda), showing that neither side was willing to give in nor able to deal the other a decisive blow.
King Wenceslaus of the Romans mediated and, on October 8, 1409, brokered a truce to run until June 24, 1410. Both sides used this respite not for reconciliation, but for military and political preparations for the coming war. The armies of both sides were being mustered, and both sides were seeking new allies. The Teutonic Order bribed Wenceslaus with large sums of money and obtained from him a declaration that Samogitia lawfully belonged to them. On the other hand, both sides failed in their diplomatic offensives. The Polish-Lithuanian alliance was proving stronger than expected, foiling Sigismund of Hungary’s efforts to cause a split between Poland and Lithuania.
In the lead-up to the war’s resumption, Władysław II Jagiełło and Vytautas made a strategic decision. Both planned to combine their forces and march straight for Marienburg (Malbork), the capital of the Teutonic Order. This was a risky strategy that differed greatly from the expected tactics and aimed to completely surprise the Order. Continuing to conduct raids along the border was crucial, as it was key to keeping the Order’s forces as dispersed and unprepared for the main strike as possible. This Battle of Grunwald intro will look into how the planned surprise played out, making it one of the most pivotal events in Eastern Europe’s history.
The Armies of Grunwald: Composition and Allies
The Battle of Grunwald was one of the largest in the Middle Ages in terms of mobilization and the concentration of forces from across Europe, but no reliable historical source has yet provided the exact numbers. The numbers in the chronicles, written at that time, are not very credible. Since the battle, they have become a source of nationalist sentiment and still are, resulting in many different estimates.
The most commonly cited estimate (especially in Western literature) is that of the Polish historian Stefan Kuczyński: 39,000 troops on the Polish-Lithuanian side and 27,000 on the Teutonic Knights’ side. The exact composition of the troops under the command of the Polish-Lithuanian alliance and the Teutonic Knights is not known, but the forces included cavalry, infantry (pikemen, archers, etc.), and even artillery units. The forces were not homogeneous, and each army had its heavy cavalry units.
Kuczyński’s numbers include all military personnel, regardless of their fighting capabilities or the arm they serve. The Teutonic Knights were outnumbered, but in the quality of their fighting force, training, discipline, and equipment, they had an advantage. Their force was heavily dependent on heavy cavalry. Although only a part of the Teutonic force consisted of these knights, they had advantages in weaponry, such as bombards capable of firing lead and stone projectiles.
These armies were characterized by the diversity of their composition. As a rule, both sides were accompanied by numerous mercenaries and allies from various European states. The Teutonic Knights’ allies came from Westphalia, Frisia, Austria, Swabia, Bavaria, and Hungary (Nicholas II Garai and Stibor of Stiboricz). In turn, the Polish–Lithuanian side included, among others, mercenary units from Moravia and Bohemia (Jan Žižka may have also taken part). Alexander I of Moldavia also participated in the battle, leading the Moldavian expeditionary corps; for his bravery, he was awarded the royal sword Szczerbiec.
As with composition, the command was also related to the complex nature of the forces involved. In turn, the management of the Teutonic Knights’ army was more centralized. The Knights’ army was commanded by the order’s leadership, which emphasized a disciplined, uniform approach. The Polish–Lithuanian alliance, with King Władysław II Jagiełło as the nominal commander and Grand Duke Vytautas taking an active role in field command, demonstrated a federative command structure that integrated various national contingents while pursuing common operational objectives. It was Vytautas who was at the forefront of the battle.
The Strategic March to Grunwald
The Polish-Lithuanian army marched on Grunwald in an organized and well-planned fashion. The first stage of the advance consisted of concentrating the forces at Czerwińsk, 80 kilometers from the Prussian border, where the Vistula was crossed via a pontoon bridge between June 24 and 30. The Polish forces from Greater Poland were concentrated in Poznań, and those from Lesser Poland in Wolbórz. On June 24, King Władysław II Jagiełło, with his Czech mercenaries, reached Wolbórz. Three days later, they arrived at the meeting point with the Lithuanians, who had left Vilnius on June 3.
As the Polish-Lithuanian army prepared to march north to Marienburg (Malbork), the Prussian capital, they preserved secrecy about the movement, which was essential for achieving surprise. However, their concentration was betrayed by Hungarian envoys who came to negotiate a peace treaty.
Learning of the Polish-Lithuanian plan, Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen of the Teutonic Knights swiftly concentrated 3,000 troops at Schwetz (Świecie) and massed his main army on the Drewenz (Drwęca) River, where he set up a fortified defense line. To force a crossing there, King Władysław II Jagiełło’s scouts found a heavily fortified Teutonic Knights’ crossing at Kauernik (Kurzętnik). On July 11, following a meeting with the war leaders, Władysław II decided to move his army east to the sources of the Drewenz to avoid fighting along the river and to keep the road to Marienburg unblocked.
The Opening Moves of the Battle of Grunwald
At dawn on 15 July 1410, the meadows between Grunwald, Tannenberg (Stębark), and Ludwigsdorf (Łodwigowo) were packed with the concentration of armies. The battlefield stretched about 4 square kilometers. The Polish-Lithuanian and Teutonic Knights’ forces were deployed along a northeast–southwest line, the former situated east of Ludwigsdorf and Tannenberg. The troops were arrayed in three lines, with the Polish heavy cavalry forming the left flank and the Lithuanian light cavalry the right, while the center was a corps of mixed mercenary soldiers. The formations were wedge-shaped and quite deep.
At the head of the Teutonic Knights stood Grand Marshal Frederic von Wallenrode. He placed the elite heavy cavalry of the Order in the first line, in the hope that the Lithuanians would attack at once. The Teutonic Knights, in their heavy armor, remained in their position, forming a virtually motionless line as the hours of the morning passed in a burning sun. During the light rain that began to fall, the dampened gunpowder allowed for the use of only two shots from the cannon.
Additionally, the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order sent two swords as a gift to King Władysław II Jagiełło and Grand Duke Vytautas. The move was meant to be an insult to the allied monarchs, which the Order hoped would make them attack at once. The swords, known as “Grunwald Swords”, later became symbols of Polish defiance and bravery.
The battle commenced with Vytautas leading a vigorous assault on the Teutonic left flank. This intense engagement persisted for over an hour until the Lithuanian light cavalry, possibly overwhelmed, commenced a full retreat.
According to Jan Długosz, a huge disaster of the Lithuanian army started at that moment. The Knights considered the battle already won, but it was a bit early to celebrate, because they broke the order in an attempt to chase the Lithuanians, which costed them dearly later.
In fact, Długosz’s account also contrasts with other contemporary sources and with more recent historians, who emphasize the Lithuanian nature of the rear-guard battle. According to them, the Lithuanian retreat was a ruse de guerre, possibly modeled on a similar tactic employed by the Golden Horde. The Lithuanians pretended to flee in order to entice their enemy into pursuing them. The full encirclement and annihilation of the pursuing enemy forces was reserved for a later stage of the battle.
The Turning Tides at the Battle of Grunwald
Intense combat ensued between the Polish units and the Teutonic Knights as the Lithuanian forces executed their retreat. The Teutonic troops, led by Grand Komtur Kuno von Lichtenstein, concentrated on overpowering the Polish right flank. This part of the battlefield witnessed the heart of the Teutonic offensive, with six of von Walenrode’s banners redirecting from the retreating Lithuanians to join the fierce engagement against the Poles. Amid the chaos, the royal Kraków banner, a significant symbol of Polish resistance, was momentarily captured when its standard-bearer, Marcin of Wrocimowice, was overcome. However, the banner was swiftly recaptured, symbolizing the resilience and unyielding spirit of the Polish troops.
Władysław II Jagiełło then ordered up the second line of reserves, doubling the strength of the Polish counter-attack. Understanding the seriousness of the moment, Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen took 16 banners, almost one-third of the Teutonic original force, and personally charged the hard-pressed Polish right flank in a last-ditch attempt to turn the tide.
In response, Jagiełło committed his last reserves, the third line of the army. The battle reached its climax at the moment when the final reserves of both sides engaged around the Polish command post.
The climax of the battle was reached when a Teutonic knight (his name is variously given as Lupold or Diepold of Kökeritz) chose to attack the king himself, Władysław II Jagiełło. The blow was only parried by the personal intervention of the king’s secretary, Zbigniew Oleśnicki, who would from this moment gain an influence in the kingdom. This was the critical moment of the Battle of Grunwald, the moment after which the battle descended into its final set-piece maneuvers.
The Decisive Endgame at Grunwald
As the battle climaxed, the reorganized Lithuanian forces, previously feigned in retreat, made a critical reentry into the fray. They launched a surprising assault on the Teutonic Knights from the rear, catching the already engaged Teutons off guard. This maneuver was a turning point, dramatically shifting the balance as the Polish knights and the Lithuanian cavalry combined began to overwhelm the Teutonic lines. Amid the chaos, Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen, leading his troops in an attempt to break through the Lithuanian ranks, met his demise. Historical accounts vary, with one chronicler naming Dobiesław of Oleśnica as the knight who fatally wounded von Jungingen, while another attributes the critical blow to Mszczuj of Skrzynno.
Zawisza the Black, a legendary Polish knight and national hero, played a prominent role in the Battle of Grunwald, contributing to the pivotal victory over the Teutonic Knights. Known for his prowess and unyielding valor, Zawisza was part of the heavy cavalry, fighting under the royal banner of King Władysław II Jagiełło. As a symbol of chivalry and bravery, he not only fought with distinction during the battle but also provided moral inspiration for his peers. His participation at the Battle of Grunwald solidified his reputation across Europe and left a lasting legacy in Polish and European history, epitomizing the ideals of knightly virtue and steadfastness in the face of overwhelming odds.
The Teutonic forces found themselves leaderless and surrounded with their leader fallen, triggering a disorganized retreat towards their encampment. This retreat turned disastrous when their camp followers, in a stunning act of betrayal, turned against the knights. The Teutonic camp, hastily fortified with wagons, was meant to serve as a last line of defense. However, the improvised fortifications quickly fell, leading to a brutal and conclusive sack of the camp. Reports suggest that the carnage at the camp claimed even more lives than the battlefield itself, underlining the total collapse of Teutonic defenses.
In the aftermath, the Teutonic Order sought to explain their devastating defeat by attributing it to internal treachery. Nicholas von Renys, commander of the Culm banner and a known sympathizer of Poland, was accused of deliberately lowering his banner, signaling a false surrender that precipitated the panic and rout of Teutonic forces. Without a formal trial, von Renys was executed, his death marking a desperate attempt by the Order to rationalize the loss.
This narrative of betrayal resonated deeply in later German historiography, echoing the “stab-in-the-back” myth that emerged after World War I as the Order grappled with the implications of their defeat at Battle of Grunwald. This battle lasted nearly ten hours and reshaped the power dynamics in Eastern Europe.
Aftermath of the Battle of Grunwald: A Transformative Victory
The aftermath of the Battle of Grunwald severely affected the Teutonic Order’s military and political stature. Casualty reports from the period indicate staggering losses, with conflicting figures ranging from 8,000 to 18,000 dead, pointing to the sheer brutality and scale of the conflict. Notably, the Order’s records show a drastic reduction in their ranks, with only a fraction of their forces returning to claim their pay at Marienburg. This decimation extended deeply into their leadership, with many key figures, including Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen, killed during the battle. The loss of leadership created a vacuum and immediate disarray within the Order’s ranks, exacerbating their defeat.
In the immediate tactical aftermath, the Polish and Lithuanian forces captured several high-profile prisoners, including dukes and other nobility, who were later ransomed for considerable sums, further straining the Order’s resources. However, despite their decisive victory at Battle of Grunwald, the Allied forces needed to capitalize on their advantage. Their delayed approach to Marienburg allowed the Order time to fortify their capital and prepare a robust defense, ultimately staving off the siege. This delay underscored a missed strategic opportunity to decisively dismantle the Order’s power base.
Battle of Grunwald’s broader implications were felt over the subsequent years, reshaping the region’s geopolitical landscape. While resolving some territorial disputes, the Peace of Thorn in 1411 failed to deliver significant gains for Poland and Lithuania, highlighting the complexities of medieval diplomacy. However, the financial reparations imposed on the Teutonic Order sowed the seeds of long-term economic and political decline. Struggling under the weight of indemnities, increased taxes, and the cost of mercenary forces, the Order faced internal dissent and external pressures, eventually leading to significant territorial losses and the rise of the Prussian Confederation.
This shift marked the beginning of the end for the Teutonic Order as a dominant political and military force in the Baltic region. The Battle of Grunwald’s legacy, therefore, is not just one of a pivotal battle but of a turning point that significantly weakened one of medieval Europe’s most formidable military orders. It set the stage for the rise of statehood in Prussia and the consolidation of power by its neighboring monarchies.
